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Abstract
We present a simple agent-based model of a financial system composed of lever-
aged investors such as banks that invest in stocks and manage their risk using a
Value-at-Risk constraint, based on historical observations of asset prices. The Value-
at-Risk constraint implies that when perceived risk is low, leverage is high and vice
versa, a phenomenon that has been dubbed pro-cyclical leverage. We show that this
leads to endogenous irregular oscillations, in which gradual increases in stock prices
and leverage are followed by drastic market collapses, i.e. a leverage cycle. This
phenomenon is studied using simplified models that give a deeper understanding of
the dynamics and the nature of the feedback loops and instabilities underlying the
leverage cycle. We introduce a flexible leverage regulation policy in which it is pos-
sible to continuously tune from pro-cyclical to countercyclical leverage. When the
policy is sufficiently countercyclical and bank risk is sufficiently low the endogenous
oscillation disappears and prices go to a fixed point. While there is always a leverage
ceiling above which the dynamics are unstable, countercyclical leverage can be used
to raise the ceiling. We also study the impact on leverage cycles of direct, temporal
control of the bank’s riskiness via the bank’s required Value-at-Risk quantile. Un-
der such a rule the regulator relaxes the Value-at-Risk quantile following a negative
stock price shock and tightens it following a positive shock. While such a policy rule
can reduce the amplitude of leverage cycles, its effectiveness is highly dependent on
the choice of parameters. Finally, we investigate fixed limits on leverage and show
how they can control the leverage cycle.
Keywords: Leverage cycles, pro-cyclical and countercyclical leverage, systemic risk,
financial market simulation
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1 Introduction
Borrowing is essential to economic activity, but leverage is inextricably linked to risk. On
a systemic level, the collective leveraging and deleveraging of financial institutions can
lead to booms and busts in asset markets. The recent financial crisis is a case in point
for the systemic consequences of the use of leverage.
Wide-spread deleveraging typically occurs when leveraged investors hit a constraint on
their leverage. Such a constraint may arise in a number of ways. If the investor is using
collateralized loans to fund its investments, it must maintain margin on its collateral.
Alternatively, a regulator may impose a risk contingent capital adequacy ratio. Finally,
internal risk management considerations may lead the investor to adopt a Value-at-Risk1
constraint. All of these cases effectively impose a risk contingent leverage constraint.
Now, suppose there is a negative shock in the asset market associated with an increase
in volatility, and as a result the leverage constraint tightens and investors are forced
to sell part of their assets2. As investors sell into falling markets they cause prices
to fall further. This is the start of a simple positive feedback loop in which selling
causes a depression in prices which causes further selling. In a similar way positive news
about prices can lead to a decline in perceived risk. This leads to increased leverage
which leads to further price increases. This dynamics is referred to as a leverage cycle,
see e.g. Geanakoplos (2003) and Gennotte and Leland (1990). A similar dynamic has
also been studied in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), where the authors investigate
the destabilizing feedback between funding liquidity and market liquidity. A further
discussion on the destabilizing effects of margin can be found in Gorton and Metrick
(2010).
It is widely believed that an important driver of leverage cycles lies in the risk man-
agement of leveraged investors3, see for example Adrian and Shin (2008), Shin (2010) and
Danielsson et al. (2001). Further supporting evidence for the impact of risk management
on the leverage cycle can be found in Tasca and Battiston (2012), Adrian and Shin (2014)
and Adrian et al. (2012). However, less is known about the impact of the parameters of
risk management on the dynamical properties of leverage cycles and how leverage cycles
might be controlled. In order to improve our understanding of the anatomy of leverage
cycles, we develop a dynamic computational model of leveraged investors (which we will
call banks from now on) that invest in an asset market (which for convenience we call
the stock market). Banks have a target leverage that depends on the banks’ perceived
risk and may be capped at a maximum value. We make the exponent of the relationship
between perceived risk and target leverage a parameter of the model. In this way, we
are able to capture pro-cyclical leverage policies, which correspond to banks having a
Value-at-Risk constraint, and counter-cyclical leverage policies in a single model. Banks
1In simple terms Value-at-Risk is a measure of how much the bank could lose with a given small
probability.
2In principle banks can react in two ways to an increase in market risk: they can raise more capital
or sell assets. In practice many banks tended to do the latter, see Adrian and Shin (2008). This is
simply because selling assets can be much easier and faster than raising equity, in particular in times of
increasing market risk.
3A number of additional drivers of leverage cycles are discussed in the literature. In particular short-
termism, herding in financial markets and incentive distortions can play a role in the development of the
leverage cycle, see for example Aikman et al. (2012), de Nicolo et al. (2012) and Gennaioli et al. (2012).
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are boundedly rational and rely on historical data to estimate the risk of their portfolio.
Banks then adjust their target leverage based on changes in perceived risk.
Our model differs from existing models of leverage cycles and pro-cyclical leverage
in a number of ways. We develop a fully dynamic model of endogenous leverage cycles.
This differs from Geanakoplos (2003) and Geanakoplos (2010) who show the existence
of leverage cycles in a two period general equilibrium model. Our model shows how a
leverage cycle can be a sustained endogenous phenomenon where each cycle sows the
seeds for the subsequent leverage cycle. While our model set-up is similar to Danielsson
et al. (2004), we show that the endogenous dynamics induced by leverage management
and historical risk estimation are richer than initially thought. In particular, we observe
dynamics ranging from stable fixed points to chaos to unstable behaviour.
Banks in our model rely on historical data for the estimation of their portfolio risk,
and are in this sense explicitly boundedly rational. This sets us apart from the model
developed in Zigrand et al. (2010) who consider endogenous risk as an equilibrium con-
cept in a financial market with rational VaR constrained investors. The fact that rational
investors can correctly anticipate future volatility and correctly estimate portfolio adjust-
ments needed to reach their leverage targets, means that they settle into a fixed point
equilibrium. In contrast, as we show here, boundedly rational investors will under or over-
shoot, and the inherent instability of the leverage cycle induces oscillations. Thus while
as shown in Geanakoplos (2010)) bounded rationality is not essential for the existence
of leverage cycles, the mismatch between actual market risk and perceived portfolio risk
as well as the uncertainty about the extent of price impact have important behavioural
consequences that increase the severity of the leverage cycle. The fact that pursuing a
target leverage policy can be destabilizing in the case of imperfect knowledge about the
extent of market impact has been originally pointed out in Caccioli et al. (2014) and
underlies much of the analysis done in this paper.
Another important point of comparison is the agent-based model of leveraged investors
developed in Thurner et al. (2010) and Poledna et al. (2013), which is also dynamic and
boundedly rational. They studied leveraged value investors such as hedge funds that
are subject to a leverage ceiling imposed by the lender. In their model the leverage
actually used by investors varies dramatically based on investment opportunities and as
a consequence the leverage ceiling is only occasionally reached. In this model the bank
is a dummy agent with infinite capital whose only role is to provide credit to funds. In
contrast, in the model developed here the banks are the key strategic agents. They always
use full leverage, adjusting it as needed to match a regulatory target. Thus the model
introduced here studies the underlying mechanism of the financial crisis of 2008, whereas
the earlier model of Thurner et al. (2010) is more relevant to circumstances such as the
near meltdown of Long Term Capital Management in 1998.
In contrast to most models in the agent-based literature, we also develop and study
simple reduced models. Their simplicity makes them amenable to the tools of dynamical
systems theory and allows us to fully characterize the stability properties of the financial
system depending on the parameters of our model. This approach improves our under-
standing of why the system destabilizes when leverage is high and how changing the
banks’ risk management can make the system more stable.
Given that volatility is persistent in time, reducing leverage when historical volatility
is high is rational from the point of view of a solipsistic individual who is unconcerned
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about possible systemic effects. Thus a risk manager who does not think about the market
impact of her institution, or that of other similar institutions, will naturally pursue a pro-
cyclical leverage policy. By this we mean that such an investor will lower leverage when
historical volatility is high. As we explicitly show here, from a dynamical systems point
of view this is inherently destabilizing.
A regulator can potentially correct for this systemic risk by imposing a countercyclical
policy, in which leverage is actually increased when historical volatility is high. We have
set up our model such that we can continuously change from pro-cyclical leverage policies
to counter-cyclical leverage policies and explicitly test the impact of different policies on
systemic risk. Countercyclical policies are being widely discussed; our model provides
a simple way to get insight into their consequences. We find that making risk control
more countercyclical can indeed be effective in decreasing systemic risk, and provide some
insight into how this happens. To our knowledge we provide the first study of the effect
of counter-cyclical leverage on the properties of the leverage cycle.
We also study a scenario in which a regulator adopts a rule to control the banks’
required Value-at-Risk quantile. Under this rule the regulator will allow banks to increase
their leverage in response to negative price shocks and will require them to decrease their
leverage following positive price shocks. In this regime the regulator effectively targets a
particular level of asset prices and leverage in the financial system. Our model allows a
qualitative evaluation of such a policy rule and provides insight into the circumstances
under which it can be effective.
It is worth commenting that while countercyclical policies and systemic risk are dis-
cussed in Basel III, the usage of expected shortfall4 is also inherently pro-cyclical, for
the same reason that VaR is inherently pro-cyclical. Thus without an active policy to
manage expected shortfall countercyclically, similar results to those found here should
apply.
The analysis of our model yields five main results:
• Pro-cyclical leverage management as prescribed in Basel II leads to the endogenous
generation of recurring bubbles and crashes in stock prices. These dynamics are
driven by the banks’ historical risk estimation and leverage adjustment. We refer
to this phenomenon as the leverage cycle.
• The amplitude of leverage cycles, i.e. the extent of price crashes, increases as the
banks’ riskiness increases. By increasing this sufficiently (and thereby increasing
leverage targets) it is always possible to destabilize the system.
• Counter-cyclical leverage policies can stabilize the system under certain conditions
on the riskiness of banks but do not solve the issue of leverage cycles in general.
• Temporal control of the bank’s riskiness (via the Value-at-Risk quantile) can de-
crease the amplitude of leverage cycles but its effectiveness is strongly dependent
on the parameter choice for the policy rule.
• Fixed leverage limits can also curb leverage cycles effectively if set to an appropri-
ately low level.
4 Expected shortfall is the loss above a given quantile of the return distribution (whereas VaR is the
quantile itself).
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Before proceeding, we would like to mention that the financial model presented here
can be coupled to a macroeconomic model in order to study the spill-over effects of the
leverage cycle from the financial sector to the real economy. In fact, an unpublished
earlier version of this paper studies exactly this phenomenon. In that paper, we couple
the financial model developed here with a simple macroeconomy by allowing banks to
give loans to firms in the real economy. Via this credit channel the financial leverage
cycle affects the activity in the real economy. We observe that, provided that the banks’
stock and loan portfolios are sufficiently linked, leverage cycles originating in the stock
market spill over into the real economy causing cycles in credit provision and output. We
have not included these results here because they are not essential for the main results
and the macromodel complicates the exposition.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline the full
multi-asset, agent-based model of the financial system. In section 3 we will study the
dynamics of the full agent-based model. We will then develop two reduced models in
section 4 and study the parameter dependence of the system dynamics, and conclude in
section 5.
2 Multi-asset model of a financial system
We propose a simple model of a financial system consisting of leveraged investors and a
noise trader. In the following we will refer to these investors as banks. Banks are fun-
damentalists and distribute their assets across a range of tradable securities that provide
an exogenous, stochastic dividend stream. For simplicity we refer to these securities as
stocks. We focus our analysis on the dynamics induced by the leverage management and
portfolio allocation of the banks. Therefore, we abstract from the influence other financial
institutions may have on the market dynamics and subsume their activity in the noise
trader.
Crucially, banks are boundedly rational and have imperfect information about the
stock market. Therefore, banks must learn about the stock market by analysing past
observations of market behaviour. In particular, in order to manage their risk, banks
estimate the covariance matrix of their portfolio from historical price movements. Banks
then adjust their leverage based on their perception of portfolio risk. Due to the historical
estimation banks’ perceived portfolio risk may be drastically different from their actual
risk. As we will demonstrate below, this mismatch between perception and reality of
market conditions plays an important role in the dynamics of the model. In the following
sections we will outline the behaviour of the banks and the noise trader more formally.
2.1 Bank
2.1.1 Accounting
The financial system is comprised of a set of banks indexed by j ∈ {0, ..., Nb}. For ease
of exposition we will drop this index wherever possible. Banks are characterized by their
balance sheet, their investment strategy, and potential regulatory requirements. Banks
hold a portfolio of two types of assets: cash and shares in stocks. Cash is a non-interest
bearing risk-free asset, while stocks are risky assets. More formally, the asset side of the
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bank balance sheet is given by
At = ct + nTt pt,
nt =
(
n1,t, ..., nNf ,t
)T
,
pt =
(
p1,t, ..., pNf ,t
)T
,
where ct is the cash investment, nt the vector of stock ownership, pt is vector of share
prices, Nf is the number stocks. Note that the total number of shares of a given stock is
normalized to 1 such that
Nb∑
j=1
nji,t = 1 ∀i, t.
Also note that banks face a long only constraint, i.e. nji,t ≥ 0. This implies that banks
cannot short an asset which they consider overpriced. This limits the extent of arbitrage
that is possible in this setting. Mispricing may therefore persist longer than in the case
where short selling is permitted. By definition the equity of the bank is given by
Et = At − Lt,
where Lt generically represents all liabilities of the bank at time t. These liabilities
could be composed of deposits, interbank loans or other forms of short term debt. We
assume for simplicity that the banks do not face funding restrictions, i.e. should a bank
decide to increase its liabilities it always finds willing lenders. This is of course a strong
simplifying assumption. If the bank faces exogenous constraints on its funding its ability
to increase its leverage will be impaired. In this model, our focus is on the impact of
risk management on the stability of the system. Therefore we explicitly try to exclude
exogenous constraints if possible. By assuming no funding restrictions we effectively
establish a lower bound on the system’s stability.
Finally, we define the bank’s leverage as follows:
λt =
At − ct
Et .
Following LeBaron (2012) and Hommes and Wagener (2009), the budget constraint
of the bank is given by
Et = ct + nTt pt − Lt
= ct−1 + nTt−1 (pt + pit−1)− Lt−1(1 + rL,t−1)− dt−1,
where pit−1 is the Nf × 1 vector of stock dividends. rL,t−1 is a generic interest rate that
the bank has to pay on its debts. Finally dt−1 represents a dividend paid to shareholders.
We refer to the expression Lt−1rL,t−1 + dt−1 as the banks’ funding cost.
For convenience we assume that each bank’s income through dividends is equal to
its funding cost, i.e.: nTt−1pit−1 = Lt−1rL,t−1 + dt−1. This amounts to assuming that the
banks immediately pay all their income earned through dividends paid as part of stock
ownership as dividends and interest to their shareholders and lenders. However, this
excludes income through valuation gains from stock trading. This is a strong assumption
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but simplifies the decision problem of the bank significantly and allows for variable bank
equity while ignoring the market for bank debt for now. In section 4.1 we will simplify
this assumption further and assume that the equity of banks is fixed.
This assumption implies that equity only changes via changes in the prices of the
stocks in which the bank holds long positions. In particular, this assumption yields the
following simplified budget constraint:
Et = ct + nTt pt − Lt
= ct−1 + nTt−1pt − Lt−1.
(1)
2.1.2 Expectation formation
In order to form expectations about future conditions of the stock market, banks rely
entirely on the analysis of historical market data. In particular, banks use observations
of past dividends and prices to compute the expected dividend price ratio, stock price
return and variance of stock prices.
Banks are fundamentalist investors and as such base their investment decision on the
expected dividend price ratio of a stock. The expected dividend price ratio is computed
as an exponential moving average of past dividend price ratios. In particular we have for
the dividend price ratio of stock i:
rˆi,t+1 = (1− γ)rˆi,t + γΠi,t
pi,t
, (2)
where Πi,t is the dividend paid by stock i at time t and pi,t is the corresponding stock
price. We typically choose γ ∼ 0.1.
In a similar fashion, banks estimate the covariance matrix of the stocks price returns.
Banks rely on the covariance matrix of stock prices for its risk management as will be
discussed in section 2.1.4. The method used here is comparable to the RiskMetrics
approach described in Longerstaey (1996) and Andersen et al. (2006). Consider the log
return of the price of stock i: xi,t = log
(
pi,t
pi,t−1
)
which are the components of the vector
xt. First, we estimate the conditional sample mean of the return vector by
µˆt = δxt−1 + (1− δ)µˆt−1, (3)
where δ < 1 determines the horizon of this exponential moving average. In practice the
conditional sample mean of the stock price return is almost always zero. We estimate it
anyway in order ensure unbiased estimates of the covariance matrix in all cases. We now
estimate the conditional sample covariance matrix of returns by
Σt = δ (xt−1 − µˆt) (xt−1 − µˆt)T + (1− δ)Σt−1. (4)
The bank then simply assumes that the covariance matrix in the next time step is the
same as the current estimate of the covariance matrix, i.e.:
Σt+1 ≈ Σt. (5)
Note the distinction between the two concepts of returns covered in this section. On the
one hand the bank uses price dividend ratios for its investment allocation. On the other
hand it relies on stock price returns for its risk management as it has to protect itself
against stock price devaluations.
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2.1.3 Portfolio choice
Banks use a heuristic rule to compute their portfolio choice as a function of the expected
risk-return relationship of the stocks. Banks compute the risk-return ratio as follows:
si,t+1 = rˆi,t+1/σi,t+1, (6)
where σ2i,t+1 = Σii,t+1 is the ith diagonal element of the covariance matrix and rˆi,t+1 is the
expected dividend price ratio. Hence the bank’s decision criterion is simply the Sharpe
ratio of the stock. The portfolio weight wi,t of stock i is then given by the following rule:
wi,t = (1− wc) exp(βsi,t+1)∑
j exp(βsj,t+1)
, (7)
where wc is a fixed weight for the bank’s cash reserve. In an alternative specification
the bank’s portfolio choice is determined by numerically optimizing a mean variance
portfolio with “no short sale” constraints5. We found that the key results of this paper
do not depend on the specific rule for the portfolio choice. Therefore we chose the more
computationally efficient rule described above. In Appendix B we describe the alternative,
optimizing portfolio choice specification and show that the results remain unchanged.
2.1.4 Risk management
Risk management is an important component of any financial institution’s activities.
Here, we assume that banks use a Value-at-Risk (VaR) approach to control their exposure
to the stock market. In particular, banks will try to ensure that their equity exceeds their
Value-at-Risk in order to protect themselves against large losses on the stock market. This
behaviour may be due to a regulatory constraint as proposed in Zigrand et al. (2010),
Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012) and Corsi et al. (2013). However, even in the absence
of regulation, financial institutions are likely to control their Value-at-Risk. Rather than
determining the existence of a VaR type risk management approach, regulation can then
be thought of putting constraints on the parameters of the VaR model.
For simplicity, we begin by assuming that banks believe that stock returns are nor-
mally distributed with zero mean6. In this simple case we have for the per-dollar VaR
VaRa,t =
√
2σˆP,t erf
−1(2a− 1), (8)
where a is the VaR quantile and σP,t is the per-dollar conditional estimate of the portfolio
standard deviation at time t. σP,t is determined as follows:
σ2t,P = w
T
t Σtwt, (9)
where wt = (w1,t, ..., wNf ,t)T . The bank tries to ensure that its VaR does not exceed its
equity, hence:
VaRa,tAt ≤ Et. (10)
5Note that the mean variance portfolio problem cannot be solved by the usual Lagrangian approach in
the presence of “no short sale” constraints as required here. Therefore a numerical optimization method
has to be used to determine the efficient portfolio.
6Note that in practice we do find that the conditional sample mean of the stock price return is almost
always zero making the zero mean assumption model consistent.
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For a bank that maximizes its return on equity this constraint will be binding. The bank
then has the following target leverage:
λt = VaR
−1
a,t =
(√
2σP,t erf
−1(2a− 1)
)−1
= α/σP,t, (11)
where we replaced the constant (
√
2 erf−1(2a− 1))−1 by α. From equation 11 we see that
the bank’s target leverage is inversely proportional to its perceived portfolio variance.
While we derived equation 11 assuming normally distributed Gaussian returns, it is
more general and includes both the Gaussian case as well as the maximally heavy-tailed
symmetric return distribution with finite variance. In the Gaussian case for a confidence
interval a = 0.99 we obtain α ≈ 0.42. Now consider the maximally heavy tailed return
distribution. According to Chebychev’s inequality we have for the probability that the
loss X exceeds kσ:
P (X > kσ) ≤ 1
2k2
. (12)
In the maximally heavy tailed case the upper bound is tight. For a confidence interval
of a = 0.99 we have P (X > kσ) = 0.01. Thus k ≈ 7.07 and α ≈ 0.14. Therefore
from the perspective of the bank, changing its beliefs about how heavy-tailed the return
distribution is, does not fundamentally change the relationship between the perceived
risk and leverage. Instead it only scales down leverage; the bank effectively becomes a
more cautious investor.
In a given time step the bank evaluates the difference to the desired target size of its
balance sheet: ∆Bt = λtEt −At. If ∆Bt > 0 we assume that the bank simply raises the
necessary funds in order to increase its assets and liabilities by the desired amount ∆Bt.
If ∆Bt < 0 the bank will sell part of its assets in the next round in order to reduce its
assets and liabilities by the desired amount.
2.1.5 Generalized target leverage
In the following, we generalize the expression for the target leverage in Eq. 11 by intro-
ducing three potential policy parameters. (1) We add a constant σ0 to the expression for
the perceived risk, (2) we generalize the exponent of the perceived risk by setting it to
the parameter b and (3) we make α a function of time such that α → αt. We refer to
parameter b as the cyclicality parameter7. After these steps we obtain the generalized
expression for the target leverage:
λt = αt
(
σ2P,t + σ0
)b
. (13)
αt determines the scale of the bank’s leverage. We can thus think of it as a proxy for the
bank’s riskiness and refer to αt as the bank’s risk parameter. Throughout the majority
of this paper we will take α pre-determined, i.e. αt = α. In section 4.2.3 we relax this
7Note that we do not claim that these changes can be readily derived from risk management first
principles. Instead we consider a scenario in which a regulator has control over the parameters of the
functional form derived based on traditional risk management. Assuming the regulator has control over
these parameters, the question is then how these parameters should be chosen or controlled over time in
order to minimize leverage cycles.
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pro-cyclical: b = -0.5
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Figure 1: Relationship between perceived risk (x-axis) and target leverage (y-axis) as given in
equation 13 for different values of b. For all three cases we take σ0 = 0.1. We refer to the case
where b = −0.5 as the pro-cyclical leverage case. b = 0 is the constant leverage case and b = 0.5
is the counter-cyclical case.
assumption and study how αt can be controlled to mitigate leverage cycles. In the simple
case of normally distributed returns and fixed α we have α = (
√
2 erf−1(2a− 1))−1.
As can be seen in figure 1 the cyclicality parameter b determines how perceived port-
folio risk is related to the target leverage. In the case of Gaussian returns we have
b = −0.5. For negative b leverage will decrease with perceived portfolio risk. We refer
to this situation as the pro-cyclical case. Conversely, for positive b leverage will increase
with perceived portfolio risk. We call this the counter-cyclical case. Finally, σ0 is a lower
bound on the perceived portfolio risk. In the pro-cyclical case this is equivalent to a cap
on leverage, while in the counter-cyclical case it corresponds to a minimum leverage. In
most cases we take σ0 = 0. Later on we interpret σ0 as a policy parameter and investigate
its impact on the dynamics of the stock market.
2.2 Noise trader
In order to control the market power of the banks, we introduce a noise trader. The
noise trader can be thought of representing a population of hedge or mutual funds in the
market with fundamentalist trading patterns that are not fully modelled. This partial
modelling introduces a random component in its portfolio allocation. Hence we refer to
it as a noise trader. In this model the noise trader effectively acts as market maker for
the stock market.
Similar to banks the assets of the noise trader consist of a stock portfolio and a cash
reserve: AN,t = ct + nTt pt. The noise trader’s stock portfolio weights wi,t are computed
as follows:
wi,t+1 = (1− wc) vi,t+1∑
j vj,t+1
, (14)
where vi,t evolves according to a stochastic process and is not necessarily bounded between
zero and one. Therefore we normalize vi,t and multiply by one minus the required cash
weight wc to obtain the portfolio weight for stock i. Specifically, vi,t evolves according to
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the following process:
dvi,t
vi,t
= ρ(1/Nf − vi,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Portfolio balance
+ ζ(rˆi,t+1 −
∑
j
rˆj,t+1/Nf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fundamentalist
+ ηdW︸ ︷︷ ︸
Noise
,
vi,t+1 = vi,t + dvi,t.
(15)
ρ < 1 determines how quickly the portfolio returns to a balanced portfolio. ζ is a scaling
parameter to ensure that contribution of the fundamentalist term is of comparable size
to the other terms in the equation. rˆi,t+1 is the expected return and is computed in the
same ways as for banks. Finally dW ∼ N (0, 1) is a standard Brownian motion term
while η determines the standard deviation of the random walk.
This specification of the noise trader’s portfolio weights ensures that the weights do
not diverge (portfolio balance term) and are economically sensible (fundamentalist term).
In particular the second term ensures that the noise trader is a weak fundamentalist
investing a larger fraction of its portfolio into stocks with higher than average return.
Due to this fundamentalist component and due the fact that the noise trader is un-
leveraged, it stabilizes the stock market. First consider the impact of the fundamentalist
component of the weight update: If the price of a stock rises significantly, its dividend
price ratio will decrease relative to other stocks. The noise trader will then shift its port-
folio away from this stock. This process leads to a mean reversion in stock prices. The
fact that the noise trader is not leveraged means that it acts as a counter-weight to the
bank which will actively manage its leverage and thereby destabilise the market as we
will show in section 3.
2.3 Dividend process
The dividend process follows a simple geometric random walk with drift
dpii,t
pii,t
= µ+ ϕdW, (16)
where the drift term µ ≈ 0 and the standard deviation of the Brownian motion term
ϕ 1.
2.4 Stock market mechanism
In the following we propose a simple linear multi-asset market clearing mechanism that is
based on the single asset markets developed in Hommes and Wagener (2009) and LeBaron
(2012). The linearity of the approach allows efficient computation of prices and makes
this approach scalable to potentially many assets.
First consider a single stock. As mentioned earlier the total supply of shares of a
given stock is normalised to 1. In monetary units the supply of stocks, i.e. the number
of shares in the market times their price, is therefore simply given by the market clearing
price. The demand, in monetary units, for stock i is the sum over all banks’ portfolio
allocations to this stock, i.e.
Demandi,t+t =
∑
j∈I
wji,t+tAj,t+t, (17)
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where I is the set of all investors in the stock market, i.e. in this case banks and the
noise trader. wji,t+1 is investor j’s portfolio weight for stock i. Finally Aj,t+1 is the value
of investor j’s assets after market clearing.
In order to compute the market clearing price for stock i we equate demand (eq.
17) and supply (pi,t+1) in monetary units. We substitute into equation 17 the value for
the investors’ assets Aj,t+t taking into account any changes in assets due to additional
leveraging or deleveraging. We then obtain:
pi,t+1 =
∑
j∈I
wji,t+1
(
cj,t + n
T
j,tpt+1 + ∆Bj,t
)
. (18)
Note that the banks’ demand depends on the price of the stock as it determines the
wealth of the bank. As discussed above, we assume that the investor chooses the port-
folio weights prior to market clearing, i.e. the weights are not a function of the price
computed in market clearing. Furthermore, banks compute their desired asset change
prior to market clearing. Economically this corresponds to the case in which banks have
to commit to their actions prior to receiving information about the market price. In this
sense banks have bounded rationality during the market clearing process. This approxi-
mation linearises the problem as it removes the price dependence of the bank’s decision
parameters. Expressed in matrix form we have:
pt+1 = Wt+1 (Ntpt+1 + ct + ∆Bt) , (19)
where W is the Nf × |I| matrix of stock portfolio weights, N is the |I| × Nf stock
ownership matrix, c is the vector of cash reserves and ∆Bt is the vector of asset changes.
Thus the market clearing vector of stock prices is given by:
pt+1 = U
−1
t+1Wt+1(ct + ∆Bt)
Ut+1 = 1−Wt+1Nt
(20)
Note that for the stock prices to be well defined two conditions have to be satisfied: (1)
There must exist a bank j such that cj,t > 0 and (2) the matrix U must be invertible. In
practice these conditions are always satisfied.
3 Leverage cycles in the multi-asset model
In this section we will study the dynamics of the multi-asset model with one bank, three
stocks and a noise trader. Below we will briefly comment on the choice of parameters for
this section. All parameters are summarized in table 1. We will then proceed to discuss
the results of the simulations.
3.1 Simulation set up
Banks: We run the simulation with only one bank since we are not explicitly studying
the impact of heterogeneity among banks. In the homogeneous case we are considering
here several banks could always be collected into one representative bank. The initial
equity of the bank E0 sets the monetary scale of the simulation and has no impact on
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Agent Parameter
Notation Description Value
Bank δ Memory parameter in covariance estimation 0.1
α risk parameter 0.1
b cyclicality parameters −0.5
E0 Initial bank equity 23
λ0 Initial bank leverage 5
wc Cash weight 0.2
γ Memory parameter in return estimation 0.1
β Intensity of choice in portfolio allocation 0.1
Nb Number of banks 1
Noise trader AN,0 Initial noise trader assets 115
ρ Portfolio balance parameter 0.05
ζ Fundamentalist parameter 5
η Standard deviation Brownian motion 0.2
Dividend process µ Dividend drift term 10−5
φ Standard deviation 0.05
NS Number of stocks 3
Table 1: Overview of simulation parameters for full model. The most important parameters for
dynamics of the model are δ, α and b. The initial conditions listed are only relevant in setting
the relative sizes of the bank to the noise trader. This is important in order to stabilize the
dynamics of the model.
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the actual dynamics of the simulation. We therefore just pick an arbitrary number. We
choose an initial leverage λ0 that lies roughly in the order of magnitude of a real bank.
The initial assets are then determined by the initial leverage and equity. We calibrate γ
to introduce some momentum into the bank’s portfolio weights.
We choose α to obtain roughly realistic levels of leverage in the simulation. Finally
the value for the memory parameter in the exponential moving average to estimate the
portfolio covariance matrix corresponds roughly to the value recommended in the original
manual on the RiskMetrics approach, see Longerstaey (1996).
Noise trader: We choose the size of the noise trader such that its market power is
sufficient to stabilize the market dynamics somewhat while not dominating them. The
remaining parameters are calibrated such that the noise trader on average neither loses
nor gains money. In general we find that the investor with more stable portfolio weights
tends to accumulate money over the course of the simulation. In order to counteract
this tendency we increase the standard deviation η in the Brownian motion term of the
weight update rule until we find that on average neither agent accumulates equity.
3.2 Leverage cycles
In order to demonstrate how leverage management can affect the model dynamics, we
will contrast two cases:
1. Passive case: The bank does not manage its leverage but invests into stocks ac-
cording to its fundamentalist portfolio rule. This means that the bank’s leverage
changes passively as stock prices changes. If prices go up, the bank’s leverage will
go down and vice versa. In particular, a bank will not borrow more if its leverage
goes down, nor will it sell assets when its leverage goes up.
2. Active case: The bank actively manages its leverage as outlined in section 2.1.4
and invests into stocks according to their fundamentalist portfolio rule. This means
that the bank has a target leverage that is determined by its perceived portfolio
risk. If it is above its target leverage it will sell assets and repay part of its debt
while it will borrow more and invest more if it is below its target leverage.
We wish to emphasize that the passive case is manifestly unrealistic, and is merely a
reference point for comparison. Over the long run the leverage of such a bank would make
a random walk, and after a sufficiently long time would eventually become so large to
cause the bank to default. Nonetheless, this provides an interesting point of comparison
because such a bank does not have to do any trading to adjust its leverage, and therefore
has no systemic impact. Thus in a sense this represents a “pure" case. Since we are only
simulating for a short period there is not enough time for the leverage to eventually reach
large values.
In the following we will document the qualitative behaviour of the model by studying
exemplary time series. In the subsequent sections we will study the model in more detail,
develop an intuition on the drivers of the dynamics induced by leverage management and
study the parameter dependence of the dynamics.
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Figure 2: Comparison of two exemplary time series for the price of an individual stock. Top:
Bank does not manage its leverage. Bottom: Bank actively manages its leverage. Clearly the
variation in the active case is much larger than in the passive case. When the bank manages
its leverage prices undergo recurring patterns of relatively gradual increase in price followed by
drastic price crashes. When the bank does not actively manage its leverage, prices are driven
exclusively by the portfolio adjustment of the bank to changing dividend price ratios and the
activity of the noise trader.
In figure 2 we compare two time series for the price of an individual stock generated
by the model starting from the same initial conditions. The top panel shows case 1 in
which the bank does not manage its leverage. This means that the bank does not have
a target leverage and its leverage simply changes as the value of its assets changes: if
the value of the assets appreciates the leverage of the bank decreases and vice versa. In
contrast to the bank that actively manages its leverage, we have for the passive bank’s
change in assets through leveraging or deleveraging ∆Bt = 0 throughout. Therefore,
in the top panel the price movements are solely driven by the bank and noise traders
portfolio adjustment.
The bottom panel corresponds to case 1 in which the bank actively manages its
leverage. Recall that under active leverage management the bank reacts to decreases in
perceived risk by increasing its target leverage. Similarly, it decreases its target leverage
when perceived risk increases. Furthermore, the bank then adjusts the size of its asset
portfolio in order to reach its desired target leverage by an amount ∆Bt.
By simple visual comparison the difference in the two price time series is apparent. In
the case of active leverage management the price dynamics are characterised by recurring
gradual increases in price followed by rapid and drastic collapses in price. The price
dynamics in the passive case are driven by bank’s portfolio choice, the underlying driving
dividend process and the behaviour of the noise trader. The extent of the stock price
variation in the passive case is small compared to the active case. Most importantly
however, the fluctuations in the active case display a very clear recurring pattern while
the variation in the passive case does not.
In figure 3 we expand our analysis to a wider set of model outputs. As before, we
are running the model with one bank, one noise trader and three stocks. We plot the
following time series from top to bottom: (1) stock dividends, (2) dividend price ratio,
(3) bank portfolio weights,(4) stock prices, (5) leverage, (6) variance of stock prices, (7)
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Figure 3: Exemplary time series of the model with a bank that actively manages its leverage, a
noise trader and three stocks. Time series from top to bottom: (1) stock dividends, (2) dividend
price ratio, (3) bank portfolio weights,(4) stock prices, (5) leverage, (6) variance of stock prices,
(7) equity of bank and noise trader. As mentioned before, the leverage management leads to
recurring patterns of gradual price increases and drastic price crashes. Clearly the leverage is
inversely related to the perceived portfolio risk and strongly positively related to the level of the
stock market. Price crashes occur typically when perceived risk is very low and leverage is very
high, i.e. when banks perceive the world as very tranquil they are in fact at the highest risk.
Note that leverage cycles affect all endogenous variables in the system, in particular leading to
large variations in bank and noise trader equity.
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equity of bank and noise trader.
A few points are worth noting:
Firstly, fluctuations in stock prices correlate strongly with fluctuations in leverage
and fluctuations in leverage are anti-correlated to fluctuations in perceived portfolio risk.
In fact, equation 13 implies that perceived portfolio risk drives the changes in leverage.
Interestingly, perceived risk is lowest just before a crash, i.e. when the actual market risk
is highest.
Secondly, stock prices are strongly cross correlated. While differences in the evolution
of the stock’s dividend process affect the stock prices, prices are modulated by the changes
in leverage. This makes sense since changes in leverage determine the overall level of
investment of the bank and thereby affect all stock prices.
Thirdly, fluctuations in stock prices affect the equity of all investors in the market,
including the noise trader. Investors gain equity as the stock market rises and lose a
substantial part of their wealth during a crash. While not shown here, in general these
crashes can cause the bankruptcy of the investors.
Finally, note that the variation in leverage, stock prices and equity significantly ex-
ceeds the underlying variation in the dividend process. This indicates that the leverage
dynamics dominate the effect of the portfolio rebalancing. Taken together, figures 2 and
3 strongly suggest that the recurring fluctuations observed in leverage, stock prices and
equity result from the bank’s leverage management.
We refer to the property of leverage management leading to the observed dynamics
as pro-cyclical leverage. Furthermore, we refer to the fluctuations in leverage and stock
prices as leverage cycles. This definition of pro-cyclical leverage extends the initial def-
inition in Adrian and Shin (2008). While Adrian and Shin (2008) refer to pro-cyclical
leverage as the destabilizing effect of Value-at-Risk constraints in financial markets, fig-
ures 2 and 3 illustrate that leverage management can lead to persistent fluctuations.
Put in the language of dynamical systems, Adrian and Shin (2008) describe an unstable
feedback loop. Here, we demonstrate that the dynamics induced by VaR constraints are
richer and not necessarily fully unstable but potentially cyclical.
4 Drivers of the leverage cycle
In the previous section we demonstrated the existence of leverage cycles in a relatively
rich agent-based model of a financial sector. The banks’ behaviour is driven by two
motives: adequately distributing their portfolio across assets based on their risk-return
ratio and managing their risk by controlling their leverage. In order to better understand
the drivers of the observed leverage cycles it is useful to consider simplified versions of the
model. In particular we will consider two reduced models: (1) a two dimensional model
with one asset and one investor with constant equity and (2) a five dimensional model
with one asset, one investor and a noise trader, with variable equity.
The contribution of these reduced models will be two-fold. Firstly they allow a more
analytical study of the system’s dynamics and the development of an intuition for the
drivers of the leverage cycle. Secondly, with the use of reduced models we can efficiently
study the model dynamics in a large region of parameter space.
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4.1 Constant equity model
In the following we reduce the agent-based model outlined in section 2 to a very simple
two dimensional model, which has the advantage that it reproduces the essence of the
leverage cycle and gives clear insight into its essential features. To do this we assume a
single asset and a single investor, which means that we can drop the indices i and j in
equation 18, and that the portfolio weight wt+1 = 1 and the fraction of the stock owned
by the investor is nt = 1. The right hand side of equation (18) becomes At = ct + pt+1.
Furthermore, we assume that the equity of the investor is constant over time. While
this is a strong assumption and a departure from the original model, it is underpinned
by empirical research done by Adrian and Shin (2008). In fact, Adrian and Shin (2008)
show that investors respond to a change in assets by changing their leverage and keeping
their equity fixed. We therefore consider it justified for the purposes of this section.
If the investor always maintains her target leverage then by definition λ(t) = At/E,
where E is the equity of the investor. With these assumptions equation (18) reduces to
pt = At, which can be written
p(t) = λ(t)E. (21)
As before, the estimated variance is given by equation (4) and the target leverage by
equation (13),
σ2(t+ 1) = (1− δ)σ2(t) + δ
(
log
(
p(t)
p(t− 1)
))2
,
λ(t) = α
(
σ2(t) + σ0
)b
.
(22)
In the following we will take b = −0.5 and σ0 = 0. Eliminating prices from the system of
equations we obtain
σ2(t+ 1) = (1− δ)σ2(t) + δ
4
(
log
(
σ2(t− 1)
σ2(t)
))2
. (23)
We can re-write this as a two-dimensional deterministic dynamical system by writing
z1(t) = σ
2(t) and z2(t) = σ2(t− 1), which gives
z1(t+ 1) = (1− δ)z1(t) + δ
4
(
log
(
z2(t)
z1(t)
))2
,
z2(t+ 1) = z1(t).
(24)
In vector form this can be written z(t) = g(z(t− 1)), where z(t) = (z1(t), z2(t))T . While
this simple model will be useful to understand the destabilizing effects of pro-cyclical
leverage it has three important shortcomings:
• Firstly, the assumption that equity is fixed ignores an important aspect of leverage.
Namely that if leverage is high, equity responds more drastically to shocks in assets.
Therefore a bank with high leverage is inherently more risky than a bank with low
leverage. This is not captured in this simple model.
• Secondly, the behavior of the model is independent of the riskiness of the bank α.
This means that the model is effectively insensitive to the level of leverage the bank
takes.
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Figure 4: Exemplary time series of the two dimensional model with one asset, one investor and
constant equity. Left: We plot an extract of the price time series for 400 time steps. As in the
full model, the simple model displays clear leverage cycles (recall that in the simple model prices
are simply proportional to leverage). Right: We plot the evolution of the dynamical system
for 20,000 time steps in a phase plot, i.e. on the x-axis we plot z1 and on the y-axis we plot
z2. A state in the upper right corner of the figure moves along the straight nearly diagonal
line towards the origin, then destabilises close to the origin and quickly returns to the straight
line via a chaotic trajectory (often lingering briefly on the curve at the bottom of the figure.
The part of the trajectory on the straight line corresponds to the gradual increase in prices and
leverage while the part of the trajectory below the straight line corresponds to the drastic price
crash.
• Finally, the model is symmetric in the sign of the cyclicality parameter b. There-
fore in this model we cannot distinguish between the effects of pro-cyclical and
countercyclical leverage.
In order to address these shortcomings and study the dependence of pro-cyclical leverage
on the parameters α, δ and b we will need to turn to a slightly more advanced model
which will be introduced in section 4.2.
4.1.1 Intuition about system dynamics
We now develop an intuition for the dynamics of the system defined in equation (24).
The left panel of figure 4 clearly illustrates that the basic features of the leverage cycle are
preserved in this simple model: repeating patterns of gradual price increase followed by
drastic price collapses. In the right panel of figure 4 we plot the evolution of the system
spanned in the z1, z2 space for a long run with T = 20, 000. The evolution of the system
can be described follows:
Suppose we start in the top right corner of the phase space (the figure on the right),
or equivalently at a trough of the time series plot of the price (the figure on the left).
This corresponds to the high volatility and low leverage regime, i.e. perceived risk is high
(z1) and was high in the previous time step (z2). In the phase space the system then
moves along down the nearly diagonal straight line towards the origin, corresponding to
decreasing volatility and increasing leverage. In the time series plot the price increases
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during this period, i.e. this is the bubble phase (e.g. the great moderation).
At the origin the perceived risk is zero and the leverage is infinite. Thus the system
destabilizes as it approaches the origin, and a small perturbation is sufficient for the
system to be ejected from its stable path towards the right of the phase plot where
perceived risk is higher. In the time series plot this corresponds to the initiation of a
price crash. The system then moves very quickly through the space below the diagonal
of the phase plot until converging onto the high volatility and low leverage regime, where
the price reaches a low value and the crash is over. The leverage cycle restarts once the
system has reached the high volatility and low leverage regime. The irregular nature of
the time series and the fractal structure of the phase plot suggest that the system is not
on a limit cycle, but rather a chaotic attractor (it is deterministic so these are the only
two options).
From an economic perspective the approach towards the origin of the phase space
along the straight line corresponds to the situation where perceived risk is low and con-
tinually decreasing. However, while perceived risk is low and decreasing, the system is
actually moving towards a more and more unstable configuration in which small ini-
tial perturbations in perceived risk can cause rapid price movements and consequentially
rapid adjustments of perceived risk.
The mismatch between perceived portfolio risk and actual systemic risk is crucial in
the understanding of the dynamics observed here. As the bank learns about market risk it
relies exclusively on historical data which falsely suggest an increasingly tranquil market.
Instead, by adjusting to the lower perceived risk by taking on further leverage, the bank
manoeuvres itself into regions of increased systemic risk.
4.1.2 Linear stability analysis
To make our analysis more formal, we will study the linear stability properties of the
trajectory outlined above. Note that the system we are studying has a fixed point at
z∗ = (0, 0). This can be seen from equation (24). At a fixed point we must have z1 = z2
since z2 is simply the previous position of z1; at the fixed point z1 is fixed hence z1 = z2.
Taking the limit along z1 = z2, we obtain lim(z1,z2)→(0,0) z2/z1 = 1 due to l’Hospital’s rule.
Then the logarithm vanishes and z1 is constant. Hence z∗ = (0, 0) is a fixed point.
To compute the linear stability of the system we derive the Jacobian of the dynamical
system and then study the value of the leading eigenvalue of the Jacobian in phase space.
Recall the definition of the Jacobian: Jij = ∂gi/∂zj. Then:
J =
(
1− δ − δ log
(
z2
z1
)
/(2z1) δ log
(
z2
z1
)
/(2z2)
1 0
)
. (25)
We can now diagonalise the Jacobian to obtain its eigenvalues. The absolute value of
the largest eigenvalue of the Jacobian evaluated at the system’s fixed point determines
the stability of the system. Eigenvalues greater than 1 imply an unstable system while
eigenvalues less than 1 imply a stable system.
We can now diagonalise the Jacobian to obtain its eigenvalues. We find for the
eigenvalues:
λ± =
q1(z1, z2, δ)∓ q2(z1, z2, δ)
q3(z1, z2)
. (26)
20
For the exact functional form of the eigenvalues we refer the reader to appendix A. When
computing the eigenvalues at the fixed point z∗ = (0, 0) we must be careful along which
path to take the limit (z1, z2) → 0. In general the limit will depend on the path taken.
From figure 4 we note that the system approaches the origin on a straight line with slope
m > 18. We therefore take the limit along the path z2 = mz1, where m > 1. Then we
obtain for the eigenvalues:
lim
(z1,mz1)→(0,0)
λ− = 1/m,
lim
(z1,mz1)→(0,0)
λ+ = −∞.
(27)
The corresponding eigenvectors are:
e± = (λ±, 1)T . (28)
Therefore z∗ = (0, 0) is a hyperbolic fixed point which is stable along e− and infinitely
unstable along e+. The stable manifold corresponds to the nearly diagonal straight line
z2 = mz1 along which we are descending towards the origin. The unstable manifold
corresponds to z2 = 0.
As the system approaches the fixed point along the stable manifold it becomes in-
creasingly susceptible to small perturbations. Once a small perturbation takes the system
off the stable manifold it is ejected along the unstable manifold towards increasing z1.
Our stability analysis is therefore consistent with the computed trajectory of the system
that we show in figure 4.
The fact that the fixed point is hyperbolic is interesting from an economic point of
view. For an agent that “lives” within this system, the dynamics may appear stable for
long periods of time. The natural response for an investor in such a system is to take
on more leverage. However, as noted above, it is precisely this response that moves the
system closer to the hyperbolic fixed point and therefore makes it more susceptible to
jumping to the unstable manifold. A system characterised by a hyperbolic fixed point
can therefore transition very rapidly and unexpectedly from stable dynamics to highly
unstable dynamics.
4.2 Variable equity model
In order to study the parameter dependence of pro-cyclical and countercyclical leverage
as well as the impact of temporal control of the bank’s riskiness α(t), we turn to a
slightly more sophisticated model. In varying the parameters of the model developed in
this section, we wish to identify regions of higher and lower systemic risk. Similarly, this
model will allow us to test how effectively a regulator could control leverage cycles by
varying bank riskiness over time.
Rather than assuming constant equity at the outset, we compute the stock price
from equation (18) for one bank (indexed by B) and one noise trader (indexed by N).
Throughout this section we will assume that the stock investment of the bank is fixed at
wB while the rest is invested into cash such that wc = 1 − wB. For the noise trader we
consider two regimes: (1) the stock investment weight follows a simple stochastic process
8It turns out that this slope is exactly m = 1/(1− δ).
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or (2) the stock weight is fixed. Recall that n(t) denotes the fraction of shares owned by
the bank at time t. Further define the following terms:
λ(t) = α(t)
(
σ2(t) + σ0
)b
,
∆B(t) = λ(t)(A(t)− L(t))−A(t),
A(t) = n(t)p(t)/wB,
cB(t) = (1− wB)n(t)p(t)/wB,
cN(t) = (1− wN(t))(1− n(t))p(t)/wN(t).
(29)
λ(t) is simply the bank’s target leverage as a function of the perceived portfolio risk.
∆B(t) corresponds to the change in assets of the bank following a leverage adjustment.
A(t) is simply the total value of the bank’s assets prior to adding ∆B(t). Similarly L(t)
is the value of the bank’s liabilities before adding ∆B(t). cB and cN are the cash held
by the bank and the noise trader respectively. The bank’s riskiness α(t) may change
over time and can be controlled by a regulator. We will discuss the specification of the
regulator’s policy rule at the end of this section. Given these definitions, the bank’s
perceived portfolio risk, liabilities, stock ownership as well as the stock price evolve as
follows:
σ2(t+ 1) = (1− δ)σ2(t) + δ
(
log
(
p(t)
p(t− 1)
))2
,
L(t+ 1) = L(t) + ∆B(t),
n(t+ 1) = (wB(n(t)p(t+ 1) + cB(t) + ∆B(t))) /p(t+ 1),
p(t+ 1) =
wB(cB(t) + ∆B(t)) + wN(t+ 1)cN(t)
(1− wBn(t)− (1− n(t))wN(t)) .
(30)
Note that for α(t) = const. this model specifies a five dimensional dynamical system
with variables: p(t), p(t − 1), σ2(t),L(t), n(t). Further note that the expression for the
perceived risk is just as before in the two dimensional dynamical system.
The bank’s liabilities are updated simply based on how much the bank decided to
change its balance sheet ∆B(t). If ∆B(t) > 0 the bank borrows more and invests it into
the stock market. If ∆B(t) < 0 the bank sells assets and pays back part of its debt.
The fraction n(t + 1) the bank will own of the stock depends on how much it in-
vested into stocks and what the stock price turned out to be. Finally the stock price is
proportional to how much both bank and noise trader want to invest into stocks. The
denominator of the equation determining the stock price results from the fact that we
are solving an implicit equation for the stock price, see equation (18).
In the stochastic case the stock weight of the noise trader evolves as follows:
dwN(t+ 1)
wN(t)
= (0.5− wN(t))ρ+ ηdW,
wN(t+ 1) = wN(t) + dwN(t+ 1),
(31)
where as before ρ determines the speed of reversion to the portfolio balance. Note that
we have removed the fundamentalist component of the noise trader’s weight update since
we are not considering the impact of dividends on the dynamics of this model. Making
the stock weight of the noise trader stochastic adds one more dimension to the system
and makes it six dimensional.
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While in section 4.1 the bank’s equity was fixed, here both the equity of the noise
trader and of the bank can change according to the specification of the price process in
equation (30). In general, depending on the degree of variation in the noise trader’s stock
weight adjustment, either the bank or the noise trader lose money over the course of a
simulation. In the short run, this is a positive feature of the model as it indicates the
success of an investment strategy. In the long run however, it is problematic as eventually
one investment strategy will dominate the market, and the dynamics are not stationary.
In order to impose stationarity we redistribute equity from the winning investor to the
losing investor in every time step. In particular we adjust the above expressions for the
bank’s and noise trader’s cash as follows:
cB(t) = (1− wB)n(t)p(t)/wB + dE(t),
cN(t) = (1− wN(t))(1− n(t))p(t)/wN(t)− dE(t),
dE(t) = ξ(E0 − E(t)),
(32)
where ξ is an adjustment rate, E0 is the bank’s equity target and E(t) is the bank’s equity.
Note that this approach ensures that equity in the system is conserved. While being a
convenient simplification in order to achieve stationary system dynamics and allow long
run simulations, the stability properties of the system that we seek to investigate remain
unaffected by this simplification, see Appendix C.
In the following we will propose a policy rule on the bank’s riskiness α(t) imposed by a
regulator who wishes to stabilize stock prices. Controlling α(t) is equivalent to adjusting
the bank’s required Value-at-Risk quantile over time.
Recall that the interaction between perceived risk and stock prices can lead to fluctu-
ations in leverage and prices. An initial negative shock to stock prices increases perceived
risk and tightens the bank’s target leverage forcing. This forces the bank to reduce its
investment which in turn leads to a further drop in price. Intuitively, in order to stabi-
lize stock prices, the regulator should increase α(t) (increase the bank’s leverage) when
prices fall and decrease α(t) (decrease the bank’s leverage) when prices rise. The bank’s
riskiness should therefore be inversely related to the return on stock prices. Note that
this control policy is asymmetric in price changes while normal risk management policies
are symmetric in price changes since risk is a function of squared returns. Given these
initial considerations we propose the following policy rule for α(t):
dα(t+ 1) = ρα(α0 − α(t)) + θq(t),
α(t+ 1) = α(t) + dα(t+ 1),
q(t+ 1) = (1− δα)q(t) + δα log
(
p(t)
p(t− 1)
)
,
(33)
where ρα < 1, δα < 1 and θ are parameters. The regulator forms a temporal average
of stock returns q(t) with memory parameter δα. We refer to q(t) as the stock price
trend. If prices fall (negative returns), q(t) will decrease and eventually become negative.
Similarly, if prices recover (positive returns), q(t) increases and becomes positive. This
distinguishes q(t) from the perceived risk σ2(t) which is measured in a very similar way
but reacts symmetrically to increases and decreases in stock price.
The change in α(t) is then computed proportional to the stock price trend q(t) scaled
by the adjustment aggressiveness θ. The larger θ the more the regulator will adjust α in
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response to a given price shock. Note that α(t) is anchored in a target value α0. This
ensures that α(t) does not explode or go to zero. α(t) will revert back to α0 in the absence
of price shocks. The idea is that the regulator uses small adjustments to stabilize the
market rather than driving α to a specific value. Note that this policy rule includes two
special cases:
1. θ = 0: In this case the α(t) → α0. This is equivalent to the case where α(t) is
pre-determined and fixed.
2. δα = 1: In this case the regulator reacts immediately to every shock, i.e. there is
no smoothing of returns.
We will use the simple variable equity model model outlined above to study four
aspects of the bank’s risk management strategy:
1. How do the stability properties of the system vary with the bank’s riskiness α and
its estimation horizon δ?
2. What is the impact of counter-cyclical leverage policies (i.e. b > 0) on the stability
of the system?
3. How can a policy rule on the bank’s riskiness α stabilize the system?
4. To what extent can leverage limits stabilize the system?
The parameters for all simulations presented in this paper are summarized in table 2. In
all of the above except point 4 we will have α fixed during a given simulation. Before
we address each of the above points in sequence we discuss two exemplary time series
generated by this model in figure 5:
• Deterministic case: We simulate the system for T = 5000 time steps with fixed
weights for the noise trader. We plot an extract of this long run time series in the
top left panel of figure 5. The dynamics closely resemble the dynamics observed
in sections 3 and 4.1. We observe recurring patterns of gradual price increases
followed by rapid price crashes. Price movement correlates strongly with leverage
adjustments. In the top middle panel of figure 5 we plot the long run stock price
series versus the leverage series in a so called phase plot. In this plot it becomes
apparent that the system is not on a limit cycle. Instead its trajectory resembles a
strange attractor with chaotic dynamics. Finally in the top left panel we show the
positive correlation between changes in assets and changes in leverage that arises
naturally in this model and is in accordance with empirical evidence, see Adrian and
Shin (2008): The chaotic nature of the dynamical system is once again apparent in
the structure of the point scatter.
• Stochastic case: We simulate the system for T = 5000 time steps with stochastic
weights for the noise trader as specified in equation (31). We plot an extract of this
long run time series in the bottom left panel of figure 5. As in the deterministic case
the system shows patterns of gradual price increases followed by rapid collapses.
We plot the long run series in a phase plot in the bottom middle panel of figure 5.
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Agent Parameter
Notation Description Value
Bank δ Memory parameter in covariance estimation see run
α risk parameter see run
b cyclicality parameter see run
E0 Bank equity target 10
λ0 Initial bank leverage 5
wB Bank stock weight 0.05
n0 Initial stock ownership 0.1
ξ Bank equity adjustment rate 1.2
Noise trader ρ Portfolio balance parameter 0.9
η Standard deviation Brownian motion 0.01
Policy rule α0 Equilibrium risk parameter see run
ρα Relaxation rate 0.5
δα Memory parameter for return estimation see run
θ Adjustment aggressiveness see run
Table 2: Overview of simulation parameters for the variable equity model. In this section we
sweep the first three parameters α, δ, b. The bank stock weight wB is simply 1 − wc. n0 sets
the relative size of the bank to the noise trader. We chose our parameters such that the market
impact of the bank is relatively low relative to the noise trader. We achieve this in particular
by setting wB and n0 to low values. Furthermore we choose the noise level from the noise
trader to be comparatively low as we want to focus on the dynamics resulting from the leverage
adjustment of the banks. The value for most parameters for the policy rule for the temporal
control of the bank’s riskiness depends on the particular run. We choose the relaxation rate to
be relatively high in order to insure that the bank’s riskiness returns quickly to the equilibrium
value α0 that the regulator desires.
Here a clear positive correlation between stock prices and leverage is visible despite
the stochastic component stemming from the noise trader. As in the deterministic
case we plot in the bottom right panel, the changes in assets versus the changes in
leverage. Again, we clearly observe the empirically documented positive correlation
between changes in assets and changes in leverage.
4.2.1 Riskiness and estimation horizon
Intuitively lower bank riskiness and a longer estimation horizon should lead to a more
stable system. As the riskiness α is decreased, the level of leverage decreases as well
as the speed of leverage adjustment. Therefore decreasing α should always stabilize the
system. The longer the estimation horizon (i.e. the smaller δ) the slower the bank will
respond to market shocks. A longer estimation horizon can be thought of introducing
inertia that stabilizes the system.
We investigate this intuition by running the model in the stochastic case for T = 5000
with α ∈ (0, 0.7], δ ∈ (0, 0.5], b = −0.5 and σ0 = 0. For each run we record the coefficient
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Figure 5: Example time series of reduced model with one bank, one noise trader and one stock.
Parameters as indicated on plot and b = −0.5 and σ0 = 0. Top panel: deterministic case with
noise trader weights constant. Top left: time series for stock price and bank leverage for a 500
time step interval. Top middle: Phase plot of leverage vs stock price for 5000 time steps. Note
the while the system dynamics in the short 500 time step interval resemble a limit cycle, the
long run phase plot indicates that the system is in fact on a strange attractor. Top left: Scatter
plot of log changes in assets vs log changes in leverage. This reproduces the positive correlation
between changes in assets and changes in leverage originally noted in Adrian and Shin (2008).
Bottom panel: Stochastic case with noise trader weights evolving as specified in model. Bottom
left: time series for stock price and bank leverage for a 500 time step interval. Bottom middle:
Phase plot of leverage vs stock price for 5000 time steps. Bottom left: As for the deterministic
case we show the positive correlation between log changes in assets and log changes in leverage.
In both the stochastic and the deterministic case, the system clearly displays leverage cycles.
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Figure 6: Stability properties of the model as a function of bank riskiness and the risk estimation
horizon. We plot log10 of the average coefficient of variation of the price time series for different
values of bank riskiness α and estimation horizon δ. Darker colors correspond to lower coefficient
of variation. There is a region for low bank riskiness α and low δ (long estimation horizon)
where the system stabilizes (blue region). Here the stochastic dynamics due to the noise trader
dominate the dynamics induced by the bank’s leverage management. As the bank riskiness is
increased the variation of the prices increases across all values of δ.
of variation of the price time series ignoring the first 20% of the time series. The coefficient
of variation is defined as CV = σ/µ, where σ is the standard deviation and µ is the mean,
and provides a useful nondimensional proxy for volatility. We then average over 40 seeds
to obtain a value for the average coefficient of variation for each pair of α and δ. We
summarize our results in figure 6.
The space spanned by α and δ can be roughly divided into two regions. A relatively
stable region (blue region) in which the coefficient of variation of the stock price is be-
low 10−1.5 and a less stable region (green/orange region) above this threshold. In the
stable region the dynamics due to the banks leverage management are dominated by the
noise trader. Note that this region is restricted to relatively low values of bank riskiness
(α . 0.15) and thins out as the estimation horizon decreases (δ increases). Note that
these values for α and corresponding leverage are indeed low considering that under the
assumption of Gaussian returns and a VaR confidence level of 0.99 we have α ≈ 0.4 and
for the maximally heavy tailed distribution we have α ≈ 0.17.
Finally note that the size of the stable region actually decreases again for δ . 0.04.
We do not fully understand why we observe this cusp in the stable region but hypothesize
that it is due to a characteristic time scale introduced by the mean reverting noise trader,
which roughly matches.
4.2.2 Counter-cyclical leverage policies
Counter-cyclical leverage policies have been suggested in order to increase the stability
of the financial system. The idea behind counter-cyclical leverage is to break the positive
feedback loop outlined in Adrian and Shin (2008) and allow banks to take on more
leverage as times get tough. Thus, a negative shock to stock prices can be followed by
an increase in leverage rather than a drop in leverage as is the case in standard risk
management approaches. Increased leverage pushes prices back up and thereby works
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against the initial price drop.
In this model the “direction” of leverage cyclicality is parametrized by the cyclicality
parameter b. Thus we can study the impact of b on the stability properties of the system
on the continuum between fully pro-cyclical leverage (b = −0.5) and fully counter-cyclical
leverage (b = 0.5), corresponding to a simple inversion of the relationship between risk
and leverage as implied by the Value-at-Risk approach.
In the following we study the coefficient of variation of the stock price in the deter-
ministic case for α ∈ (0, 300], δ = 0.1, b = [−0.5, 0.5] and σ0 = 0. In order to compute the
coefficient of variation we run the simulation for T = 5000 and we ignore the first 20% of
the time series. For ease of exposition we plot the coefficient of variation only where it
takes reasonable values. In the case of unstable behaviour we plot a default value of 105.
In case of bank bankruptcy we plot a default value of 104. We mark a run as unstable if
the price exceeds the maximum floating point number. Bankruptcy occurs simply when
the equity of the bank falls below zero during the run.
We summarize our results in figure 7. Visually we can identify roughly four different
regions in the left plot in figure 7:
• Unstable region (dark red): For large values of bank riskiness α the system desta-
bilizes. In this regime both leverage and prices explode. The size of this region
decreases as the cyclicality parameter b increases from −0.5 to 0.5. As b increases
towards 0 the bank adjusts its leverage downward less and less aggressively follow-
ing a shock to perceived portfolio risk. Once b becomes positive, shocks to perceived
portfolio risk actually increase leverage rather than decreasing it. This behaviour
counter-acts negative shocks to the stock price but amplifies positive shocks to price.
Therefore counter-cyclical leverage does not eliminate instability entirely.
• Bankruptcy region (light red): At the lower boundary of the unstable region, banks
tend to go bankrupt. In this region the leverage dynamics lead to a large surge in
price followed by a sudden crash sufficiently large to wipe out the bank’s equity.
• Chaotic region (yellow): In this region of the parameter space the model displays
fluctuations similar to the ones observed throughout this paper (see for example
figure 5). The size of this region increases as b increases. Importantly, the fluctua-
tions persist and are of similar intensity for both b < 0 and b > 0. Thus, as already
indicated by the existence of an unstable region for b > 0, counter-cyclical leverage
does not always dampen price deviations. This is due to the insensitivity of risk to
the direction of price movement: An increase in price leads to an increase in risk
which leads to an increase in leverage which further increases the price. In this case
the positive feedback loop runs in the opposite direction to the pro-cyclical case,
i.e. positive price shocks are amplified whereas in the pro-cyclical case negative
price shocks are amplified. Nonetheless, this feedback loop is damped by the noise
trader and the countercyclical case is more stable than the pro-cyclical case. The
stronger the pro-cyclicality, the higher the stability threshold.
• Stable region (blue): For relatively low levels of bank riskiness α and large values
of b the system goes to a fixed point as is indicated by the vanishing coefficient of
variation.
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Figure 7: Stability properties of the model as a function of bank riskiness and the cylicality
parameter b. We plot log10 of the coefficient of variation of the price time series for different values
of bank riskiness α and cyclicality parameter b. Darker colors correspond to lower coefficient of
variation. Dark and light red correspond to unstable dynamics. Left: full plot for α ∈ (0, 300],
b = (−0.5, 0.5]. We plot a default value of 104 for the coefficient of variation if the bank goes
bankrupt during the simulation (light red) and a default value of 105 (dark red) if the dynamics
are unstable (i.e. a variable exceeds the maximum floating point number). Clearly the extent
of the unstable region decreases as the cyclicality parameter b increases from −0.5 to 0.5. The
yellow region displays leverage cycles while the blue region corresponds to a fixed point.
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Figure 8: Stability properties of the model with temporal control of α(t) as a function of the
adjustment aggressiveness and the estimation horizon of the stock price trend. We plot log10 of
the coefficient of variation of the price time series for different values of the adjustment rate θ
of α(t) and the memory parameter δα. For relatively low values of θ we recover the case where
α is approximately fixed and observe comparatively high values for the coefficient of variation.
Similarly for very low values of δα the coefficient of variation is relatively high - the regulator does
not respond quickly enough to price shocks. However, these relationships are non monotonic.
As both δα and θ are increased, first a region of relative stability emerges which then turns into
a region of relative instability in the upper right quadrant. Here the regulator is over-reacting
to changes in prices and destabilizes the system rather than stabilizing it.
These findings show that risk management based on historical estimates of portfolio risk
can give rise to a variety of dynamics ranging from stable to chaotic to unstable behaviour.
The way banks react to changes in perceived risk and how much leverage they take is
crucial in determining which behaviour the system will display.
4.2.3 Temporal control of bank riskiness
In the previous section we showed that a positive relationship between perceived risk and
leverage can stabilize the system. However, it does not eliminate instability entirely since
for b > 0 positive shocks to the stock price are amplified. This behaviour is ultimately
due to the symmetry of risk to changes in stock price: both positive and negative shocks
can increase risk.
One way to break this symmetry is to apply a policy rule that is based on stock
returns rather than squared returns as proposed above. In the following we study the
coefficient of variation of the stock price under the policy rule specified above for α(t)
with parameters δα ∈ [0, 0.7] and θ ∈ [0, 7.0]. In order to compute the coefficient of
variation we run the simulation for T = 5000 and we ignore the first 20% of the time
series. Furthermore we take α0 = 0.1, δ = 0.1, b = −0.5 and σ0 = 0. We study the
system in the deterministic case.
We summarize our results in figure 8. Again, we can visually identify three regions:
• High CV region 1: For relatively low values of θ we recover the case where α
is approximately fixed and observe comparatively high values for the coefficient
of variation. Similarly for very low values of δα the regulator does not respond
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quickly enough to price shocks and again α is approximately fixed. As for low θ the
coefficient of variation of the stock price is relatively high in this region. Indeed, to
some extent θ and δα can compensate for each other producing the region to the
right of the graph in which the CV is relatively high and roughly constant.
• Low CV region: For intermediate values of θ and δα the regulator successfully
reduces the coefficient of variation. In fact the application of the temporal control
of α reduces the CV by one order of magnitude. This is quite a substantial increase
in stability.
• High CV region 2: As θ and δα is increased further, the CV increases again and
returns to nearly as high values as in the region in the right of the plot. The non-
monotonic behaviour is due to an overly strong forcing of the system by the actions
of the regulator. The rule that was initially designed to stabilize the dynamics,
destabilizes the system if applied to strongly.
Clearly, the application of a policy rule to control the bank’s riskiness can help in-
crease the stability of the system. Interestingly, there appears to be an optimal region
in parameter space where the policy rule is most effective in stabilizing the system. This
“sweet spot” corresponds to the blue band that is clearly visible in figure 8. The rule
is effective if the regulator’s response is sufficiently forceful and quick to overcome the
destabilizing effect of the bank’s risk based leverage adjustment. However, the regulator’s
response should not be too aggressive. In fact, if she reacts too aggressively the level of
the coefficient of variation returns to levels observed in the absence of the policy rule.
This can be seen by comparing the coefficient of variation in the top right quadrant of
figure 8 with the band on the very left where θ = 0, i.e. the case without policy rule.
Increasing the level of α0 increases the overall level of the coefficient of variation,
consistent with figures 7 and 6, but does not change the qualitative structure of figure 8.
Similarly holding α0 fixed and increasing b from −0.5 to 0.5 decreases the overall level
of the coefficient of variation while the qualitative structure remains unchanged at first.
However, as seen in figure 8, when b becomes sufficiently large the system goes to a fixed
point for sufficiently low α. In this region, the impact of the policy rule vanishes since
the system already goes to a fixed point.
In order to further illustrate the impact of the policy rule on α(t) we present two time
series in the stochastic regime: one with policy rule and one without. In particular we
use the following parameters: α0 = 0.5, δ = 0.1 and δα = 0.2. Recall that for θ = 0 we
recover the uncontrolled case. Therefore we use θ = 0 for the case without policy rule
and θ = 3.0 for the case with policy rule. We present our results in figure 9 where we
compare both stock and leverage time series for both cases.
Two aspects are worth noting. Firstly the application of the policy rule reduces the
amplitude of the leverage cycle both measured by fluctuations in price and leverage.
However, it does not achieve a complete elimination of the leverage cycles. Secondly, the
reduction in the amplitude of low frequency leverage cycle comes at the cost of small
amplitude high frequency oscillations that are introduced by the policy rule. The fact
that the policy rule results in very fast changing values of α(t) raises questions about the
practical applicability of such a rule. The frequency of these oscillations is likely to be
inversely related to the parameter ρα.
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Figure 9: Price and leverage time series with noise for the cases with and without a policy rule
on α. Left panel: No policy rule. Right panel: With policy rule with parameters δα = 0.2 and
θ = 3.0. Note that the application of the policy rule maintains both average levels of price and
leverage but reduces the amplitude of low frequency fluctuations. This comes at a cost of very
high frequency fluctuations of low amplitude.
4.2.4 Leverage limits
Another intuitive way of stabilizing the system would be via imposing leverage limits on
banks. If the leverage limit is chosen sufficiently low, the leverage cycles shown throughout
this paper should be damped if not eliminated entirely. We investigate this intuition by
running our model in the stochastic case for a range of values for σ0. Throughout this
study we take α = 0.2, δ = 0.1 and b = −0.5. In order to give σ0 a more intuitive
interpretation we introduce the effective maximum leverage λm = ασb0. Note that in
practice the maximum leverage imposed by a particular value of σ0 will be lower than
λm since it ignores the actual perceived portfolio variance.
We summarize our results in figure 10. Clearly the variation in the price series and
the maximum leverage of banks increases as we increase λm. The effect of λm saturates
as the system reaches its unconstrained target leverage. Since the bank will not increase
its leverage beyond this value, an increased value of λm will have no effect on the bank’s
leverage dynamics. Thus, not surprisingly, a maximum leverage will only be effective if
chosen inside the actual decision interval of the bank.
4.3 Policy implications
In this paper we studied the stability implications of leverage management based on
historical estimation of portfolio risk. From a policy perspective the insights resulting
from this study have a number of implications:
• Risk appetite: The riskiness of a bank’s leverage management strategy strongly
affects the stability of the system. The riskier a bank’s strategy the larger its impact
on the leverage cycle. Its behaviour will lead to stronger price surges prior to a crash
and more violent crashes. At the same time, once the bank’s riskiness falls below
a certain level, the system stabilizes. This somewhat discontinuous transition from
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Figure 10: Left: Three exemplary time series for different values of effective maximum leverage
λm. Clearly the absolute level variation in the stock price time series increases as the leverage
limit is increased. For a very low leverage limit the system effectively goes to a fixed point.
Right: Right axis: average coefficient of variation of the stock price for different of λm. Left
axis: Average maximum leverage of the bank for different λm. As the right plot already indicated,
the coefficient of variation and absolute level of leverage increase as λm is increased. However
there is a λm above which further increases in λm have no effect in stabilizing the system. If
the effective maximum leverage is above the bank’s desired leverage level in the absence of a
leverage limit, the leverage limit will have no effect. Note that the effective leverage limit λm
is not in one-to-one correspondence with the actual observed maximum leverage in the system.
The observed maximum leverage is always less than or equal to λm since the leverage target is
computed not only on the basis of λm but also the banks’ perceived portfolio risk.
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stable to unstable behaviour is relevant for regulators as small changes to policy
may have a large impact on the system wide dynamics.
• Risk estimation horizon: Naively, fast updating of beliefs about market conditions
should allow banks to better react to potential risks. While this may be true for
an individual bank, the systemic impact of such behaviour is destabilizing. Our
analysis indicates that shorter estimation horizons decrease the stability of the
system up to a point: Surprisingly, there is a finite time horizon that maximizes
the stability of the system.
• Counter-cyclical leverage: Counter-cyclical leverage increases the system’s resilience
to negative price shocks and increases the “safe operating zone" for the financial
system. It is not a panacea – there is always a leverage ceiling above which the
system is unstable. Nonetheless, as we move from pro to counter-cyclical leverage
the ceiling gets steadily higher.
• Temporal control of bank riskiness: The amplitude of leverage cycles can be reduced
through the introduction of a stock return based policy rule on bank riskiness.
However, two caveats apply. Firstly, a reduction in the amplitude of leverage cycles
comes at the cost of introducing small amplitude - high frequency fluctuations.
Secondly, a policy rule is only effective in a relatively small region of its parameter
space. Careful calibration would therefore be required.
• Leverage limits: Leverage limits can be an effective tool to dampen leverage cycles
if at set to an adequate level.
It is important to note that our results do not suggest that the absence of risk management
is preferable over historically based risk management. Instead we take the existence of
risk management as given for its obvious beneficial effect on the individual bank’s balance
sheet. Our focus is on how such risk management affects the stability of the system
as a whole. The challenge for the regulator is then to identify regimes in which risk
management is indeed stabilizing both on an individual level and on a systemic level.
This model is completely qualitative, but it nonetheless indicates the form that such
tradeoffs may take.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we study the implications of historically based bank leverage management
on the stability properties of the financial system. To this end we develop an agent-based
model of a multi-asset financial system and study it computationally in its full form and
two simplified versions.
The banks’ risk management is at the center of our model. In particular, we study
banks that are subject to a Value-at-Risk constraint. In order to compute their Value-
at-Risk, banks estimate the covariance matrix of their portfolio using an exponential
moving average of the past returns of their investments. This set up establishes an inverse
relationship between perceived portfolio risk and the bank’s desired leverage level.
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One central result of this paper is that the dynamics resulting from bank leverage man-
agement are richer than the unstable feedback between leverage, risk and asset prices (see
Adrian and Shin (2008)) that is usually referred to a pro-cyclical leverage. In particu-
lar we show that bank leverage management can cause recurring patterns of stock price
bubbles and crashes which occur in a chaotic regime of the system. We refer to these
recurring bubbles and crashes as leverage cycles.
The intuition behind leverage cycles is simple: Suppose the bank’s perceived portfolio
risk is low and its leverage is high, i.e. the bank believes it is in tranquil times. Then
an initial shock in the stock market leads to an increased perceived portfolio risk. When
perceived risk is low and bank leverage is high, only a small shock to perceived risk
will lead to a large adjustment of target leverage. This occurs simply by virtue of the
functional form of the inverse relationship between risk and target leverage. A large
adjustment in target leverage forces the bank to unload a large part of its assets. The
associated market impact causes a further increase in perceived portfolio risk. Therefore
a small initial shock can cause a downward spiral of prices and leverage. As leverage
decreases more and more the bank’s leverage adjustment rate to changes in market risk
decreases. This property ultimately stabilizes the downward spiral and the market begins
to recover. As the market recovers, perceived risk goes down and leverage and asset prices
increase. This recovery sows the seeds for the next crash.
The four main parameters of this model are: (1) the bank’s riskiness α, which de-
termines the bank’s level of leverage, (2) the portfolio risk estimation horizon δ, (3) the
cyclicality exponent b, which makes it possible to tune from pro-cyclical to countercycli-
cal leverage and (4) the effective maximum leverage λm. We vary these parameters to
investigate and answer four main questions within this model:
• How do the system’s stability properties depend on the level of the banks’ riskiness
α and the smoothing parameter for volatility estimation, δ? Not surprisingly, in-
creasing α tends to increase volatility and and if it is sufficiently large, it is always
possible to destabilize the system completely. (The only case where this is not true
is when there is strong countercyclical leverage and α is sufficiently low that the
system exists at a fixed point). Varying δ gives more interesting results: If δ is large,
corresponding to a short estimation, decreasing δ (and thereby lengthening the hori-
zon) reduces volatility and makes the system more stable. Surprisingly, however,
we find that there is a parameter δc where the stability reaches a maximum, and
further decreasing δ make the system less stable.
• Under which circumstances do counter-cyclical leverage policies stabilize the system?
Counter-cyclical leverage policies can stabilize the system if the cyclicality exponent
is sufficiently large and the banks’ riskiness is sufficiently small. This happens in
two senses: Starting from the purely pro-cyclical leverage (b = −0.5) and increasing
b to make the policy more countercyclical is clearly beneficial, raising the leverage
ceiling where instability occurs. For reasonably low risk levels, making the policy
fully countercyclical (b = 0.5) can completely stabilize the system by driving it to
a fixed point. However, for large values of α counter-cyclical leverage policies still
generate volatility and even instability. Therefore, while such policies do not solve
the issue of leverage cycles in general, they can be effective in damping them.
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• Can temporal control of the bank’s riskiness α increase stability? A regulator may
decrease the amplitude of the leverage cycles by increasing α in response to negative
price shocks and decreasing α in the case of positive price shocks. The effectiveness
of this simple rule will depend on the time horizon over which the regulator measures
the price movements and the aggressiveness of his response. Interestingly, this
relationship is non-monotonic yielding a region of optimal measurement horizon
and aggressiveness. However, control of leverage cycles comes at the cost of low
amplitude - high frequency fluctuations.
• How effective are leverage limits (λm) in order to control leverage cycles? Leverage
limits can curb leverage cycles effectively if set to an appropriate level. If the lever-
age limit exceeds the bank’s target leverage in the absence of a leverage limit, the
stock market dynamics remain unchanged by the introduction of the leverage limit.
As the leverage limit is decreased, the amplitude of the leverage cycle decreases.
The model that is developed here is very simple and focuses on the impact of a single
representative bank on the stock market behaviour. In the future it would be worthwhile
to extend this model to a heterogeneous population of banks. Intuitively one would expect
that heterogeneity in the portfolio positions of banks, their riskiness and their estimation
horizon can increase the stability of the system. An interesting question would then
be under which circumstances bank behaviour synchronizes. Then, under synchronized
action we would expect to recover the dynamics observed for one representative bank.
A related extension would be to attempt a rough calibration of the model to a realistic
financial system. A calibration would involve not only adjusting the relative sizes of the
investors and their market impact but also the bank’s response time to changes in leverage.
We are currently assuming that the bank can adjust its leverage from one time step to the
next. Introducing realistic constraints on this process is likely to increase the credibility
of the model and allow the comparison with real financial time series.
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A Eigenvalues of constant equity model
In the following we will derive the eigenvalues of the constant equity model in section 4.1.
Recall the Jacobian of the dynamical system:
J =
(
1− δ − δ log
(
z2
z1
)
/(2z1) δ log
(
z2
z1
)
/(2z2)
1 0
)
. (34)
We can now diagonalise the Jacobian to obtain its eigenvalues. We find for the eigenvalues:
λ± =
q1(z1, z2, δ)∓ q2(z1, z2, δ)
q3(z1, z2)
, (35)
where
q1(z1, z2, δ) = −2δz1z2 − δz2 log
(
z2
z1
)
+ 2z1z2,
q2(z1, z2, δ) =
√
8δz21z2 log
(
z2
z1
)
+
(
2δz1z2 + δz2 log
(
z2
z1
)
− 2z1z2
)2
,
q3(z1, z2) = 4z1z2.
(36)
The corresponding eigenvectors are:
e± = (λ±, 1)T . (37)
B Alternative portfolio allocation
In the main model we propose a simple portfolio allocation rule based on the Sharpe ratio
of a particular stock. In the following we will discuss an alternative portfolio allocation
approach based on portfolio optimization subject to a Value-at-Risk constraint. The bank
chooses the vector of portfolio weights w in order to maximize:
max
w
w · rˆ
subject to E − awTΣw ≥ 0,
wi ≥ 0,∀i
(38)
where rˆ is the vector of expected stock returns, E is the bank’s equity and Σ is the bank’s
estimated portfolio variance. This problem cannot be solved analytically due to the no-
shorting constraints on the portfolio weights. In the implementation of the simulation we
use a numerical optimizer to compute the results.
In figure 11 we show an example run for a simulation with all parameters as in table
1 in section 3.1. However instead of using the simple portfolio allocation based on the
Sharpe ratio we solve the above optimization problem to compute the portfolio weights.
The main dynamics, namely leverage cycles, remain unchanged under this alternative
portfolio allocation scheme. Since our focus is on leverage cycles, we chose the simpler
portfolio allocation method for computational efficiency. The simple portfolio alloca-
tion method runs approximately 20 times faster than the method based on numerical
optimization.
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Figure 11: Exemplary time series of the model with a bank that actively manages its leverage.
Time series from top to bottom: (1) dividends, (2) dividend price ratio, (3) leverage, (4) variance
of stock prices, (5) stock prices, (6) bank portfolio weights, (7) equity of bank and noise trader.
C Effect of equity redistribution on model dynamics
In section 4.2 we introduce a redistribution mechanism of equity from the noise trader
to the bank and vice versa. We introduce this mechanism in order to make the model
dynamics stationary. In the absence of the equity redistribution the noise trader gradually
accumulates equity since his passive trading strategy is superior to the bank’s active
strategy in the presence of leverage cycles. This non-stationarity makes the interpretation
of long simulation runs difficult. Thus the equity redistribution mechanism is a very useful
feature.
In the following we illustrate that the equity redistribution mechanism does not affect
the principal dynamics of the model presented in section 4.2. In figure 12 we show two
exemplary leverage time series of the model presented in section 4.2 for standard parame-
ters as indicated on the plot and summarized in table 2. The blue time series corresponds
to the case with equity redistribution while the green time series corresponds to the case
without equity redistribution. Clearly both time series display leverage cycles of simi-
lar frequency and amplitude. However, the cycle in the absence of equity redistribution
slowly increases in amplitude. This is due to the fact that the equity of the bank slowly
declines over the cycles. This non-stationarity is removed by the equity redistribution
mechanism.
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Figure 12: Exemplary leverage time series of the model presented in section 4.2 for standard
parameters as indicated on the plot and summarized in table 2. The blue time series corresponds
to the case with equity redistribution while the green time series corresponds to the case with-
out equity redistribution. Clearly both time series display leverage cycles of similar frequency
and amplitude. However, the cycle in the absence of equity redistribution slowly increases in
amplitude. This is due to the fact that the equity of the bank slowly declines over the cycles.
This non-stationarity is removed by the equity redistribution mechanism.
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